

308

This document consists of 1 page.  
Number 3 of 10 copies. Series A

**SECRET-OADR**

6/PNC

**November 5, 1962**

## MEMORANDUM

**SUBJECT: Barricade to Interference with US  
Aerial Surveillance**

Unless we make crystal clear to the Soviets and to the Cubans that we will brook no interference with our unilateral aerial inspection, we will undermine any credence in our insistence on longer-range inspection in addition to making exceptionally difficult our own interim unilateral effort. If we are not prepared to take forceful steps to counter the use of force against ourselves, we will rightly or wrongly (and either would be bad) undermine belief that we would ever resort to force to meet intransigence on all the unresolved issues concerning present and future verification arrangements.

The Soviets have flatly said that all antiaircraft weapons were in Cuban hands (New York 1951 of October 31; Kuznetsov to McCloy). If it became necessary to undertake military action against Cuban air defenses as a result of their interference in our reconnaissance, we could make public the fact that the Soviets had informed us that such weapons were all in Cuban hands. This would reduce the already very remote possibility that the Soviets would react in any serious way to such actions on our part in reprisal.

Soviet military advisors and technicians were present with the Egyptian forces at the time of the Suez invasion in October 1956. We do not know whether any were killed in the Anglo-French strafing and bombing, but in any case the Soviets made no protest whatsoever. They did quietly evacuate their technicians through the Sudan as soon as that was practicable.

While it would be undesirable to undertake unnecessary military action endangering Soviet personnel, it would be even more undesirable to give them the impression that our resolve was so weak that we would permit Americans to be killed in conducting operations which even the Soviets have passively recognized must now occur. Finally, as noted above, the Soviets have authoritatively (whether correctly or not) washed their hands of Cuban air defense weapons.

The best course of action would probably be to eliminate interfering missile or gun sites or aircraft if possible, or comparable weapons on a reprisal basis.

**Q/PM: RLCartha of: neg**

~~SECRET~~  
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CADR

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**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

ENCLOSURE III (308)

This document consists of 1 page.  
Number 3 of 14 copies, Series A

4/24

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 5, 1962

MEMORANDUM

**SUBJECT: Attempts to Interference with US**  
**Aerial Surveillance**

Unless we make crystal clear to the Soviets and to the Cubans that we will brook no interference with our unilateral aerial inspection, we will undermine any credence in our insistence on longer-range inspection in addition to making exceptionally difficult our own interim unilateral effort. If we are not prepared to take forceful steps to counter the use of force against ourselves, we will rightly or wrongly (and either would be bad) undermine belief that we would ever resort to force to meet intransigence on all the unresolved issues concerning present and future verification arrangements.

Soviet military advisors and technicians were present with the Egyptian forces at the time of the Suez invasion in October 1956. We do not know whether any were killed in the Anglo-French strafing and bombing, but in any case the Soviets made no protest whatsoever. They did quietly evacuate their technicians through the Sudan as soon as that was practicable.

While it would be undesirable to undertake unnecessary military action endangering Soviet personnel, it would be even more undesirable to give them the impression that our resolve was so weak that we would permit Americans to be killed in conducting operations which even the Soviets have passively recognized must now occur.

The best course of action would probably be to eliminate interfering missile or gun sites or aircraft if possible, or comparable weapons on a reciprocal basis. DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MS

Q/PM:RLGarthoff:pop

REVIEWED by J. K. i/Kev'U' L DA

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( ) DENY ( ) Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions 167 (1)

TO authority to.  
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87- DOS 0317

**BB**

**TOP SECRET COVER SHEET**

TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

6/PM/26/62

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

**Memo dtd 11-5-62 re Reprisals to Interference  
US Aerial Surveillance**

### 3. COPY INFORMATION

**ACTION COPY**                      **INFORMATION COPY**

TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC.

COPY NO. 3 OF 10 COPIES

**2. FORWARDED**

11-5-62

7/25/20

**Rose-Perruso** NOT SIGNED

(See Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

115-62 Shirley Cowgar

PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR  
READING DOCUMENT

**OFFICE  
SYMBOL**

**WISNATOWSKI, J.** 1963, 7: 1

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Mr. Ball

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY  
G/PM

EXCISE 6  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 6/UDC/KR

REVIEWED BY 92

DATE 4/1/68

PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

November 5, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reprisals to Interference with US  
Aerial Surveillance

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G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep

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